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There has been an increasing recognition that firms need to extend their informational scope 
beyond organizational boundaries in order to address demands for environmental transparency. It 
is also clear that a substantial share of environmental impacts stem from factors upstream in a 
firm’s supply network. We examine the relationships between structural characteristics of a focal 
firm’s supply network and the firm’s extent of environmental information disclosure, recognizing 
that supply network structure has implications for the focal firm’s ability to access and leverage 
environmental information embedded in its supply network. Using Bloomberg’s proprietary 
Supply Chain Relationships database, we construct supply networks for focal firms and 
operationalize each focal firm’s information access as closeness centrality; information control as 
betweenness centrality, and supply network complexity as network density. We also draw data from 
Bloomberg (including Environmental, Social, and Governance data) for firm-level environmental 
and financial measures. Using econometric techniques to test our hypotheses, we find that while 
information access and information control are positively associated with the extent of 
environmental information disclosure, supply network complexity has an inverted-U relationship. 
Importantly, we also find evidence that a focal firm’s external environmental supplier management 
and internal environmental quality management practices strengthens these relationships. Thus, 
our work contributes to the research on transparency in supply chains by showing how the 
structural configuration of a firm’s upstream supply network, in conjunction with its external and 
internal environmental governance practices, either facilitates or constrains the firm’s ability to 
disclose environmental information. 
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The structural configuration of a firm’s supply chain network and the governance strategies 
adopted by the firm influence its ability to effectively develop and deliver products and services 
(Choi & Krause, 2006; Narasimhan & Narayanan, 2013). Viewing innovation from a sustainability 
perspective, firms that wish to develop environmentally/socially responsible processes (e.g., 
responsible minerals assurance process (RMAP) compliant, or sustainable forestry initiative (SFI) 
certified) or products (e.g., restriction of hazardous substances (RoHS) compliant, or fair trade 
certified) need to understand the nature and content of informational flows through their supply 
chain networks. For example, in an attempt towards sustainability-driven product innovation, 3M 
is faced with the task of extracting information from its estimated 5,000 paper, pulp, and packaging 
suppliers to ensure that they are providing materials that originate from sustainably-logged timber 
(Forbes, 2017; Reuters, 2015). Thus, developing sustainable processes (e.g., more transparent) and 
products (e.g., more eco-friendly or pro-social) requires the ability to access and process 
information flows within supply chain networks (Drake & Spinler, 2013). Our study focuses on 
the implications of network structure and governance mechanisms adopted by focal firms for their 
extent of environmental information disclosure as a form of supply chain transparency. 
Supply chain transparency has been receiving increasing attention in apparel, retail, and high 
tech industries (Doorey, 2011; New, 2010). The sustainability impact of a firm is often better 
understood by examining its supply chain structure (New, 2010). An estimated 14% of carbon 
emissions within industries stem from firms immediately belonging to the industries, with the other 
86% stemming from members of the industries’ total supply chains  (Drake & Spinler, 2013; 
Matthews et al., 2008). Sprint Nextel, for example, has over 94% of its overall carbon footprint 




within a firm’s upstream supply chain tiers can result in lower environmental and likely negative 
market outcomes for the firm’s products. Sony experienced such an outcome when hazardous 
cadmium levels found in its cables resulted in a delay of 1.3 million PlayStation console sales, 
leading to excessive storage, replacement, and repacking costs, and an ultimate forfeiture of over 
$100 million in estimated lost sales (Carlton, 2006).  
While there is increasing agreement about the relevance of the supply chain to a focal firm’s 
environmental sustainability, an initial step towards addressing environmental impacts is the 
identification and measurement of environmental contaminants (Dutt & King, 2014). In a supply 
chain context, this can be achieved through extracting environmental information from supply 
chain partners, which requires that a firm extends its informational scope beyond organizational 
boundaries to consider supply chain factors that drive risks, costs, and opportunities (Drake & 
Spinler, 2013). However, accessing environmental information from the supply network can be 
highly challenging, especially in complex modern-day supply chains. For example, recent research 
in environmental operations (Caro et al., 2013; Jira & Toffel, 2013; Luken & Stares, 2005) has 
highlighted the challenges faced by companies in accessing environmental information located in 
their supply chains. Though progress has been made in understanding the technical (Caro et al., 
2013), market (Jira & Toffel, 2013) and regulatory (Reid & Toffel, 2009) drivers of supply chain 
transparency, previous research has not investigated how the structural configuration of a firm’s 
supply network is associated with the firm’s extent of environmental information disclosure. Yet, 
network scholars have argued that structural characteristics of the supply chain network play an 
important role in determining the way in which information and knowledge flow across firm 
boundaries (Burt, 1992; Choi & Hong, 2002; Freeman, 1979). Building on the prior literature on 




characteristics of a focal firm’s supply chain have implications for information flows within the 
supply network and, ultimately, the extent of environmental information disclosure by the firm. 
To examine the relationship between the supply network structure of a focal firm and its extent 
of environmental information disclosure, we represent a firm’s upstream suppliers as nodes and 
each cost-of-goods-sold (COGS)-based supply chain relationship as a link in the firm’s supply 
network. With regard to network structure, we identify three principal constructs – information 
access, information control, and supply network complexity – that influence information flows 
from the upstream supply network to the focal firm. Specific metrics from network theory help 
capture the firm’s level of access to and control over information in its supply network. 
Specifically, we operationalize information access as closeness centrality and information control 
as betweenness centrality. These two metrics are determined by the firm’s structural position 
within the network based on its direct (i.e., first tier) and indirect (i.e., second tier and beyond) 
links to suppliers. Also, these metrics can be used to identify centrally positioned buying firms, 
who can benefit from knowledge and information flow opportunities unavailable to those at the 
periphery (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lin et al., 2007). Higher closeness centrality implies a “shorter” 
supply chain, entailing less distortion of information and improved access to information (Lee et 
al., 1997). Higher betweenness centrality implies a greater “gatekeeping” role between the firm 
and otherwise disconnected partners in the supply network, thereby enhancing the firm’s ability to 
access non-redundant sources of information (Burt, 1992). Finally, we operationalize supply 
network complexity as supplier network density. The density of a buying firm’s supplier network 
has been shown to influence collaboration and information flows (Dyer, 1996; Dyer & Hatch, 




how the focal firm’s extent of environmental information disclosure is related to its levels of 
information access, information control, and supply network complexity. 
Furthermore, as we are also interested in the implications of supply chain governance strategies 
adopted by a firm, we examine the facilitating role of two practices: First, we examine whether a 
focal firm’s involvement in environmental supplier management can amplify the informational 
benefits of a favorable supply network structure. Environmental supplier management practices 
may include joint efforts with suppliers towards waste or emissions reductions and improving 
resource efficiency. Supplier engagement has been shown to open new channels for leveraging 
information (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000), enhancing learning (Muthulingam & Agrawal, 2016), and 
encouraging environmental disclosure (Jira & Toffel, 2013). Thus, environmental supplier 
management practices should help focal firms better leverage their network positions to obtain 
environmental information that would have otherwise been difficult to access.  
Second, we examine whether environmental quality management implemented by the focal 
firm to manage the environmental impacts of its operations, can enhance the informational benefits 
of a structurally favorable supply network configuration. While environmental supplier 
management is an external governance practice in that it emphasizes a firm’s supply chain partners, 
environmental quality management is internal in that it emphasizes a firm’s own facilities and 
processes. We expect that environmental quality management practices intrinsically motivate 
implementing firms to leverage their network positions to obtain and process environmental 
information from their supply network.  
To address our research questions, we use Bloomberg’s proprietary Supply Chain 
Relationships (SPLC) database to construct the supply networks of firms across several industries. 




firms located in approximately 50 countries and spanning more than 100 Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) sub-industries. Next, using focal firms as identifiers, we link this 
data with environmental disclosure and financial data from Bloomberg. Bloomberg’s proprietary 
environmental disclosure score evaluates companies based on the extent and robustness of their 
disclosure, including information on corporate policies. This score is derived from two sources: 
(1) company-produced materials, including website information, corporate sustainability/social 
responsibility reports, regulatory filings, corporate brochures, and corporate presentations, as well 
as (2) Bloomberg’s direct communication with companies, including meetings, phone interviews, 
email exchanges and survey responses. Overall, Bloomberg’s environmental disclosure score is 
based on up to 120 disclosure-related indicators and is used by more than 320,000 subscribers 
globally, including companies, investors, and analysts. Due to the diversity of data sources and 
industry- and country- and domain-specific standardization, the score substantially alleviates 
methodological concerns of lack of comprehensiveness, self-selection, and corporate 
greenwashing, which are often faced by other environmental disclosure measures. 
Our results show that greater information access and information control are both positively 
associated with more extensive environmental disclosure, whereas supply network complexity has 
an inverted-U shaped relationship with the extent of environmental disclosure. We also find 
evidence that firms that are involved in external environmental supplier management practices are 
better able to leverage their network positions to extract environmental information from their 
supply chains. Also, firms implementing internal environmental quality management practices 
experience a more pronounced informational benefit from their supply network configurations. 
Our work contributes to the body of literatures on sustainable supply chain management (Lee & 




Taylor, 2015; Reid & Toffel, 2009), and supply chain networks (Bellamy et al., 2014; Kim et al., 
2015; Kim et al., 2011; Osadchiy et al., 2016; Villena & Gioia, 2018). In the next section, we 
review the relevant literature related to supply network structure and environmental disclosure and 
develop the theoretical relationships between structural characteristics of a focal firm’s supply 
network and its extent of environmental information disclosure. In Section 3, we describe the data, 
measures, and the specification of the empirical models. Section 4 presents our main results and 
the results of various additional analyses and robustness checks. We conclude with a discussion of 
our findings and their implications in Section 5.  
LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES 
Given our focus on the relationship between structural characteristics of a focal firm’s supply chain 
and its extent of environmental disclosure, our work is related to the literatures on supply chain 
networks and information disclosure. Several studies have investigated the linkage between supply 
chain structure and firm-level outcomes. Randall and Ulrich (2001) characterize supply chain 
structure based on the proximity of production facilities to target markets and the degree to which 
production facilities are scale-efficient. They show that firms that have a greater fit between their 
supply chain structure and product variety significantly outperform their peers. Using survey 
methodology, Qi et al. (2011) show that firm performance depends on the interaction between 
competitive strategy and supply chain structure. They conceptualize supply chain structure as 
being either lean or agile, the choice of which depends on the operating environment. Jain et al. 
(2013) show that a firm’s inventory and operational performance is linked with its supply chain 
structure, specifically, its choice of global sourcing and dual sourcing policies. Bellamy et al. 
(2014) argue that firms experience greater innovation output depending on their supply network 




supply network interconnectedness. Jain et al. (2015) find that the structural configuration of the 
firm’s supply chain also affects its ability to recover quickly from disruptions. Wang et al. (2015) 
demonstrate that supply chain disruptions propagate through a supply network differently 
depending on the structures of sub-tier supply networks.  
Prior work has also studied the spillover effects of supply-chain-structural characteristics on 
the performance of the firm. For example, Serpa and Krishnan (2017) examine the mechanisms 
for productivity spillovers in supply chains. They show that productivity spillovers are more 
substantial when partner firms share similar operational characteristics. Muthulingam and Agrawal 
(2016) show that process quality can be transmitted between firms through shared suppliers, but 
only under specific conditions related to supplier and process characteristics. With regard to 
supplier-specific characteristics, they find that greater quality knowledge spillovers are achieved 
when quality improvement efforts focus on output activities of suppliers (as opposed to input or 
in-process activities) and when suppliers have lesser complexity in their operations. Similarly, 
Osadchiy et al. (2016) show that systematic shocks such as an economic recession can propagate 
through supply chains, affecting firms located at multiple supply chain tiers.  While the prior 
literature has emphasized performance spillovers attributable to a firm’s upstream supply chain 
characteristics, we extend this logic to the context of informational spillovers.  
From an environmental perspective, supply chains remain a barrier to advancing sustainability 
and carbon transparency (United Nations Global Compact, 2013). Recent research in operations 
management (OM) and environmental policy has examined drivers of environmental transparency 
in supply chains. Caro et al. (2013) highlight the challenges in accurately allocating carbon 
emissions to supply chain partners. Reid and Toffel (2009) find that investor pressure and state 




(2013) use the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) Framework to understand the conditions under 
which buyer pressure may drive suppliers’ environmental disclosures. They find that various 
factors such as buyer intentions and supply-chain-contractual conditions determine whether a 
buyer’s pressure will result in increased transparency from the supplier. In contrast, our study 
examines the role of structural characteristics of a firm’s supply network in determining the extent 
of environmental information disclosure by the firm. We argue that the more favorable the focal 
firm’s structural position, the better its ability to extract information from its supply network, 
thereby enhancing its extent of environmental information disclosure. 
While there are separate literature streams on the importance of supply network characteristics 
and environmental transparency, little is known about the environmental information benefits 
associated with supply chain structure. Yet, OM research has long underscored the importance of 
information transmission in supply chains (Cachon & Fisher, 2000; Lee et al., 1997). has shown 
that structural characteristics of the network play an important role in effective information transfer 
(Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Lipparini et al., 2014). Similarly, OM research has argued that structural 
characteristics can influence information flows in a supply chain (Choi et al., 2001; Kim et al., 
2011). A firm’s ability to access knowledge from its supply network can provide improved 
forecasting, process compliance, and sourcing (Agrawal et al., 2013).  
Building on the prior literature on information flows and supply chain structure, we posit that 
structural characteristics of a focal firm’s supply chain have implications for information flows 
within the supply network and, ultimately, the extent of environmental information disclosure by 
the focal firm. Next, we motivate the mechanisms by which structural characteristics of a focal 
firm’s supply network – namely, information access, information control, and supply network 





A buyer’s capacity to access information from its supply network can be expected to affect the 
extent of its knowledge regarding supplier activities. A supply network attribute that dictates the 
speed with which a buying firm can access information from its supply network is the “distance” 
between the buying firm and upstream firms in the supply network (Freeman, 1979). Specifically, 
the geodesic distance between a focal firm i and an upstream firm j is the shortest number of supply 
chain relationship links that connect i to j.  
Firms with shorter geodesic distances in their supply networks have greater information access 
because they are more directly exposed to sources of information than firms with larger distances. 
Furthermore, firms with smaller geodesic distances in their supply networks can reach a larger 
number of network partners through fewer intermediate supply chain links, making them better 
positioned to obtain information quickly and with less distortion (Schilling & Phelps, 2007). They 
are also able to navigate the network with greater autonomy (Kim et al., 2011), tapping multiple 
ports to retrieve more reliable information about sustainability approaches and environmental 
factors in their supply network. Soh and Roberts (2005) attribute improved information access to 
firms having to depend less on intermediaries in the network to gain information, bypassing filters 
and constraints that intermediate parties may impose. As the geodesic distance between the focal 
firm and upstream firms in the supply network is reduced, it allows for even peripheral information 
and knowledge to be accessed effectively (Fleming et al., 2007).  
Studies in OM have argued for the benefits of accessibility to high-quality information such as 
an increased ability to match supply and demand (Cachon & Fisher, 2000) as well as lower 
inventory costs (Lee et al., 2000). In a similar manner, increased information access should prove 




supply chain partners. For example, hazardous substances used by suppliers are likely to make 
their way into the outputs of the focal firm. Since firms with low geodesic distances to upstream 
firms in their networks can access information more efficiently, we expect that they will be able 
to better track environmental factors deeper within a firm’s upstream supply networks. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1). A focal firm’s level of information access in its supply network has a 
positive relationship with the extent of environmental information disclosed by the firm. 
Information Control  
Network theory suggests that a firm’s capacity to control information flows within the supply 
network is determined by the extent to which the firm occupies bridging or gatekeeping nodes 
between partners who would otherwise be disconnected. Such firms are often referred to in the 
network literature as “brokers”, as their positions allow them more power and control over 
knowledge flows in their networks (Baum et al., 2010). Firms obtain greater information control 
as they assume structural positions on shorter paths linking one supplier to another in the supply 
network (Freeman, 1979). Furthermore, such firms increasingly serve as gatekeepers in the 
network when the suppliers they bridge form denser networks of their own (Baum et al., 2010).  
A firm’s gatekeeping role also influences information flows and interactions between upstream 
firms in its network who would otherwise be disconnected (Kim et al., 2011). A gatekeeping firm 
mediates many relationships within its supply network and has the power to control network 
communications, either by facilitation or by interference. Studies in OM have highlighted the 
benefits of information control, such as increased sourcing leverage (Wu & Choi, 2005). Similarly, 
we expect that focal firms with greater information control would have greater leverage to extract 




redundant sources of information provides these focal firms with avenues to access environmental 
information across a broad swath of their upstream networks, enabling a greater extent of 
environmental information disclosure. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2). A focal firm’s level of information control in its supply network has a 
positive relationship with the extent of environmental information disclosed by the firm. 
Supply Network Complexity 
Given our context, we focus on the form of supply network complexity that arises from the level 
of inter-connectedness among suppliers in a buying firm’s network (Choi & Krause, 2006). Prior 
studies have shown a linkage between the interconnectedness of partners in a network and 
information flow benefits. Fleming et al. (2007) find empirical support for their assertion that as 
network partners of a firm become more connected, trust, information flows, and knowledge 
spillovers are facilitated within the network. Phelps (2010) finds that densely interconnected 
partner networks facilitate trust, as it reduces the threat of opportunism; each partner’s behavior is 
more visible in a denser network, and the costs of opportunism jeopardizing existing and future 
relationships outweigh the benefits. Densely connected networks also enable information to be 
more readily accessible (Burt, 1992), and information flows to be more robust due to multiple 
paths leading to the same information source in the supplier network (Villena et al., 2011). Figure 
1 offers a visual representation of increasing supply network complexity, going from left to right 
in the two rows of subfigures. 
A greater number of shared linkages within a focal firm’s supply network facilitates upstream 
collaboration and information sharing, which can in turn help the focal firm obtain environmental 




Enhanced upstream collaboration efforts can also help the focal firm to more effectively 
disseminate its environmental practices and information needs to its supply network. 
On the other hand, excessive interconnectedness between direct suppliers may lead to negative 
outcomes for the firm. For instance, too little or too much complexity in a supply network has been 
shown to dampen the resilience of a firm’s supply network to disruptions (Craighead et al., 2007). 
Maintaining a structurally complex supply network may actually lead to a larger collective 
operational burden and high coordination costs for the focal firm (Kim et al., 2011). A focal firm’s 
level of complexity in its supply network has also been shown to inhibit the diversity and novelty 
of knowledge within the supply network (Padula, 2008). An excessive number of alternative paths 
connecting the focal firm to its direct suppliers limits the firm’s ability to access novel sources of 
information and capabilities upstream, due to constraints in the firm’s information processing 
capacity (Koka & Prescott, 2002; Villena et al., 2011). Thus, while we expect the network density 
of the focal firm’s suppliers to initially improve the level of environmental information disclosed, 
we anticipate that, beyond a threshold, excessive network density may result in lower levels of 
environmental information disclosure. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3). A focal firm’s supply network complexity has an inverted-U relationship 
with the extent of environmental information disclosed by the firm. 
Moderating Effect of Environmental Supplier Management 
Firms may engage with upstream firms to implement initiatives that reduce the environmental 
footprint of the overall supply chain. Examples include engaging upstream firms in waste and 
emissions reductions and resource efficiency initiatives, or in implementing environmental 
management systems. Previous literature has shown that suppliers’ environmental practices may 




spillovers. Such practices have been shown to deliver expected as well as unexpected side benefits 
for the focal firm (Corbett & Klassen, 2006). For example, Zhu and Sarkis (2004) show that 
environmental supplier management practices, such as cooperation for eco-design and waste 
reduction are associated with improved environmental outcomes for the focal firm. Geffen and 
Rothenberg (2000) posit that partnering with environmentally proactive suppliers may lead to 
innovations that exploit previously untapped opportunities (e.g., green product design).  
Partnering with supply chain members has been recognized to facilitate collaboration efforts 
on new product or service developments and information sharing on customer orders and 
inventories (Kulp et al., 2004; Lee et al., 1997). Furthermore, a focal firm’s engagement with 
upstream firms in its supply network can give rise to norms and incentives for information sharing 
with the focal firm, which have been shown to foster trust and help streamline the sharing of 
information (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). Firms that are more engaged with their suppliers can more 
effectively leverage knowledge and information resources embedded in their supply networks, and 
help unlock previously inaccessible sources of information (Agrawal et al., 2016). Similarly, we 
expect that focal firms that engage in environmental supplier management practices are better able 
to leverage their network positions to obtain environmental information, including information 
that would otherwise have been difficult to access. In fact, the CDP’s Supply Chain Program is 
one such initiative that aims to enhance collaborations between buyers and suppliers to facilitate 
information sharing and consequent disclosure (CDP, 2016). Thus, we hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 4a (H4a). The posited relationship between greater information access and the 
extent of environmental information disclosure is stronger when the focal firm engages in 




Hypothesis 5a (H5a). The posited relationship between greater information control and the 
extent of environmental information disclosure is stronger when the focal firm engages in 
environmental supplier management.  
Hypothesis 6a (H6a). The posited relationship between greater supply network complexity 
and the extent of environmental information disclosure is stronger when the focal firm 
engages in environmental supplier management.   
Moderating Effect of Environmental Quality Management 
Environmental quality management systems typically consist of interrelated codes of practices that 
help a firm manage, measure, and improve the environmental aspects of its operations (Delmas, 
2002; Welford, 2016). A firm’s implementation of an environmental quality management system 
(e.g., ISO 14001, the EU’s Environmental Management and Auditing System (EMAS), and 
Responsible Care) requires articulating goals, gathering information, measuring progress, and 
improving performance with respect to resource use, throughput, and emissions (Florida & 
Davison, 2001; Russo, 2009). As such, a firm’s adoption of an environmental quality management 
system evidences a form of dynamic capability in the presence of environmental imperatives 
demanded of firms (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003; Russo, 2009). 
At the minimum, environmental quality management systems require firms to continually 
check for legal compliance and document all pertinent regulations they may be subject to. 
However, firms implementing environmental quality management systems have been known to 
not only improve compliance with regulations but also achieve more effective informational flows 
and greater organizational transparency (Steger, 2000). Thus, we posit that firms that implement 
environmental quality management systems are intrinsically better able to or more motivated to 




Hypothesis 4b (H4b). The posited relationship between greater information access and the 
extent of environmental information disclosure is stronger when the focal firm engages in 
environmental quality management.  
Hypothesis 5b (H5b). The posited relationship between greater information control and the 
extent of environmental information disclosure is stronger when the focal firm engages in 
environmental quality management.  
Hypothesis 6b (H6b). The posited relationship between greater supply network complexity 
and the extent of environmental information disclosure is stronger when the focal firm 
engages in environmental quality management.   
DATA, MEASURES, AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
We construct a supply-network-level dataset from Bloomberg’s proprietary Supply Chain 
Relationships (SPLC) database in order to develop the network metrics reflecting the structural 
configuration of a focal firm’s upstream supply chain. For supply chain relationship and financial 
measures, we use 2013 and 2014 data from Bloomberg’s SPLC database. Although similar supply-
chain relationship data is available from Compustat based on SEC reporting guidelines, 
Bloomberg’s database also includes information gathered from various sources such as corporate 
reports and filings, conference calls with investors, press releases, and information available on 
company websites (Bloomberg, 2011). Thus, the Bloomberg database offers a comprehensive 
account of supply chain relationships and has been used in the recent works by Osadchiy et al. 
(2016), Wang et al. (2015), and Wu and Birge (2014). 
Since Bloomberg’s SPLC data reflects dyadic relationships between firms, in order to 
organically construct the supply networks of focal firms, we first “seeded” our supply-network-




Automobiles and Components, Capital Goods, Energy, Health Care Equipment, Materials, 
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology, Semiconductors and Semiconductor Equipment, Technology 
Hardware and Equipment, and Transportation. Similar to Wang et al. (2015), we use COGS 
relationships as the basis for identifying supply network links, reflecting stable and ongoing 
relationships that are essential in constructing reliable network measures.  
Finally, we link this supply chain data on focal firms with environmental disclosure and 
financial data from Bloomberg. For environmental measures (including the extent of 
environmental information disclosure and environmental supplier management), we use 
Bloomberg’s Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) data. We augment our dataset with 
financial information for the firms (also obtained from Bloomberg) to allow us to control for firm-
specific factors that may be associated with the extent of environmental information disclosure.  
Our final sample consists of 3,105 firm-year observations (over the two-year period 2013-
2014) for focal firms located in approximately 50 countries and spanning more than 100 GICS 
sub-industries. Figure 2 provides an overview of how we assembled our dataset and Figure 3 
visually depicts the global coverage of our sample. 
<INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE>  
Dependent Variable 
Extent of Environmental Information Disclosure. We measure a focal firm’s extent of 
environmental information disclosure using Bloomberg’s proprietary Environmental Disclosure 
Score. This score is based on the extent of a company's environmental disclosure as part of 
Bloomberg’s ESG data.  Specifically, we use the Bloomberg score for the following reasons:  
Bloomberg’s Environmental Disclosure Score is one of the most comprehensive scores for 




the extent and robustness of their disclosure, including information on corporate policies. 
Bloomberg researchers use two main channels to construct the score. First, they use company-
produced materials, including website information, sustainability and corporate social 
responsibility reports, regulatory filings, corporate brochures and corporate presentations. To 
complement this information, Bloomberg also uses direct communications with companies, 
including meetings, phone interviews, email exchanges, and survey responses. In total, up to 120 
different indicators are used to collect information on a company's disclosures and Bloomberg 
continually updates these sources of information to develop a comprehensive score. Hence, one of 
the major strengths of this score is that it not only captures quantitative information (e.g., 
emissions, waste generation) but also qualitative information (content of press releases, news 
feeds) to generate a single holistic score. The Environmental Disclosure Score ranges from 0.1 for 
companies that disclose the least amount of ESG data to 100 for those that disclose every data 
point collected by Bloomberg. Each data point is weighted in terms of importance, with data such 
as Greenhouse Gas Emissions carrying relatively greater weight than other disclosures.  
Bloomberg’s Environmental Disclosure Score is used by more than 320,000 subscribers 
globally, including companies, investors, and analysts. Due to the diversity of data sources and 
industry- and country- and domain-specific standardization, the score substantially alleviates 
methodological concerns of lack of comprehensiveness, self-selection, and corporate 
greenwashing often faced by other environmental disclosure measures. Figure 4 shows the 
distributions of Environmental Disclosure Score for all the GICS industry groups in our sample. 
<INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE> 




Information Access. We capture Information Access using the network measure of Closeness 
Centrality. In the context of a supply network, closeness centrality reflects the extent to which a 
firm can act autonomously in the network to access resources, including informational resources. 
In other words, it measures the efficiency with which a focal firm can access information in its 
supply network, depending on the number of links it has to traverse to reach partners in the network  
(Kim et al., 2011). Following Wasserman and Faust (1994), we calculate Closeness Centrality as: 





(34 − 1) 
where )($, +) represents the distance or number of edges in the shortest path(s) linking the focal 
firm $ and an upstream firm +, 34 is the total number of firm $’s direct and indirect suppliers 
upstream in the supply network, and (34 − 1) reflects the minimum possible total distance between 
firm i and all of its upstream partners. 
Information Control. We capture Information Control using the network measure of 
Betweenness Centrality. Betweenness centrality reflects the extent to which a firm occupies 
bridging or gatekeeping nodes between partners who would otherwise be disconnected. Such firms 
are often referred to in the network literature as “brokers,” as their positions allow them more 
power and control over knowledge flows in their networks (Baum et al., 2010). Following Freeman 






where :.; = :;. is the number of links in the shortest path(s) from firm j to k, where :.. = :;; =
1 by convention, and :.;($) denotes the number of shortest paths from j to k that firm i lies on.  
Supply Network Complexity. We measure Supply Network Complexity using the network 




relative to the number of possible ties (i.e., a measure of overall connectedness of a network (Scott, 
2000)). Tier-1 network density reflects the number of shared relationships that exist among direct 
suppliers of a focal firm (i.e., the degree to which a firm’s supply network partners are 
interconnected, implying redundancies in ties that are built into the supply network). The use of 
network density as a proxy for supply network complexity is consistent with other papers that 
investigate the effects of structural characteristics of supply networks (Choi & Krause, 2006; Kim 








			$ ≠ + ≠ C 
where >.;($) = 1 if a relationship exists between firms + and C who are direct suppliers to focal 
firm i, and nE reflects the total number of firm i's direct suppliers. Values for the measure of 
network density can range from 0 to 1, where a value of 0 indicates that none of a firm's suppliers 
share ties with each other and, 1 indicates that every supplier of the focal firm is linked to every 
other supplier of the focal firm. 
Environmental Supplier Management. We employ Environmental Supplier Management as 
a moderating variable to test Hypotheses 4a-6a. We measure Environmental Supplier Management 
using a binary measure obtained from Bloomberg, which reflects whether or not a firm is involved 
in supplier development activities related to the environment. Such activities include (but are not 
limited to) practices such as waste reduction, resource efficiency, emissions reductions, or 
implementation of environmental management systems in the supply chain. While previous 
research has underscored the value of supplier environmental initiatives (Geffen & Rothenberg, 
2000; Zhu & Sarkis, 2004), several environmental institutional programs such as the CDP and 





Environmental Quality Management. We employ Environmental Quality Management as a 
moderating variable to test Hypotheses 4b-6b. We measure Environmental Quality Management 
using a binary measure that is recorded by Bloomberg to indicate whether a firm has initiated an 
environmental management practice or has launched an environmental management system to help 
address the environmental impacts of its own internal operations. A firm’s own set of 
environmental practices may explain its extent of environmental information disclosure (Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004). In other words, firms that are intrinsically more proactive on the 
environmental front, may also exhibit greater transparency and possess an enhanced ability to 
leverage their network positions.  
Control Variables 
We include several control variables (lagged by one year relative to Environmental Disclosure 
Score) that may be associated with the focal firm’s extent of environmental information disclosure. 
First, we control for the focal firm’s financial performance and operational characteristics. Since 
firm size may be associated with the extent of environmental information disclosure (Reid & 
Toffel, 2009; Wickert et al., 2016), we control for Revenue Turns and Sales Growth. Also, firms 
with poor profitability may have fewer resources to engage in environmental programs and, thus, 
be less transparent (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004). We therefore also control for profitability using 
Gross Margin and ROA. Also, public firms may exhibit higher transparency due to increased 
media pressure (Aerts & Cormier, 2009). Bloomberg primarily focuses on public firms but does 
collect ESG and financial information for large private firms (e.g., market cap exceeding $30 
million). Our sample contains 147 firm-year observations for private focal firms. Hence, we 
control for Ownership Status (i.e. private vs. publicly traded firm) using a binary measure. In 




extremes and therefore winsorized the sample at the 1st and 99th percentiles of the distributions of 
each of the financial measures (Chen et al., 2005; Hankins, 2009). 
Additionally, we control for industry, country, and year characteristics using dummy variables. 
The industry and country dummies control for common patterns across industry and geography; 
the year dummies account for potential differences in temporal factors. Since our sample spans 
firms in more than 50 countries, GICS codes are more suitable than other industry classification 
codes (Jira & Toffel, 2013). Using four-digit GICS codes, we control for unobservable industry-
specific characteristics, using Industry Dummy variables in our models (Reid & Toffel, 2009). To 
control for unobservable factors at the country level, we included Country Dummies in line with 
previous research on transparency (Ott et al., 2017).  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and a breakdown of firm-year observations by industry 
and country. Descriptive statistics for our dependent and independent variables are given in Panel 
A of Table 1. Panel B shows the composition of our sample, revealing a wide range of sectors and 
geographical regions being represented.       
Model Specification 
We standardize all network-related measures to facilitate comparisons of estimates, where we de-
mean the raw values and divide them by their respective standard deviations. We use OLS 
regressions on pooled 2013-2014 data with standard errors clustered by country to account for 
geographic differences in environmental disclosure; e.g., due to differences in regulatory climates 
or environmental pressures (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). Recall that we also include industry, year, and 
country dummies to account for fixed differences across sectors, time, and geographic regions. We 
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  where $ is the index for firm-year observations, and g4 the error term.  
To test our moderation hypotheses H4a,b, H5a,b, and H6a,b, we add the corresponding 
interactions to the above model. 
<INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>  
ANALYSIS 
Main Results  
Table 2 summarizes the main results for the relationship between supply network structure and 
extent of environmental information disclosure (measured as Environmental Disclosure Score). 
From model (6) in Table 2, we find that Information Access (β=0.34; p<0.1) is significantly and 
positively associated with Environmental Disclosure Score. This result supports H1. From Model 
(6) in Table 2, we find that Information Control is also positively associated with Environmental 
Disclosure Score (β=0.62; p<0.01), supporting H2. From Model (5) in Table 2, we find that while 
Supply Network Complexity (β=0.89; p>0.1) is not significantly associated with Environmental 
Disclosure Score, Supply Network Complexity2 (β=-0.16; p<0.1) is (weakly) negatively associated 
with Environmental Disclosure Score, suggesting some evidence of limits to the benefits of ties 
among suppliers. However, we do not find significant results for Supply Network Complexity in 
the model (6). Thus, H3 is weakly supported. Figure 5 plots the relationship between Supply 
Network Complexity and Environmental Disclosure Score, evidencing the inverted-U relationship. 
Next, we discuss the moderating effects of Environmental Supplier Management and 




Environmental Supplier Management is positively associated (β=11.41; p<0.01) with 
Environmental Disclosure Score. To test H4a-H6a, we interact Environmental Supplier 
Management with Information Access, Information Control, and Supply Network Complexity 
respectively. We discuss results from the model (11) of Table 3. We find that Environmental 
Supplier Management significantly strengthens the relationship between Information Access and 
Environmental Disclosure Score (β=1.29; p<0.01). However, we do not find significant evidence 
that Environmental Supplier Management strengthens the relationship between Information 
Control and Environmental Disclosure Score (β=0.14; p>0.10), but we do find a significant 
interaction effect (β=0.75; p<0.05) in the partial model (2). Thus, we find support for H4a but 
weak support for H5a. These results are depicted in the interaction plots in Figures 6a and 6b. 
Observe that the relationship between Information Access/Information Control and Environmental 
Disclosure Score is almost non-existent for focal firms that do not engage in environmental 
practices with suppliers. This finding, in turn, corroborates the value of such engagement by focal 
firms in unlocking environmental information embedded in their supply networks. From Model 
(4) of Table 3 (and as depicted in Figure 6c), we find that Environmental Supplier Management 
weakly moderates the inverted-U relationship between Supply Network Complexity and 
Environmental Disclosure Score; however, this result is not supported in the full model (11). Thus, 
H6a is weakly supported. Overall, we find reasonable evidence that firms that engage their 
suppliers in environmental management practices are better able to leverage their network 
positions to extract environmental information from their supply networks.  
Finally, we discuss our findings for the moderating effect of Environmental Quality 
Management, based on the results presented in Table 3. As expected, Environmental Quality 




test H4b-H6b, we interact Environmental Quality Management with Information Access, 
Information Control, and Supply Network Complexity respectively. From Model (11) of Table 3, 
we find that Environmental Quality Management does not moderate the relationship between 
Information Access and Environmental Disclosure Score (β=0.88; p>0.1). However, we find that 
Environmental Quality Management significantly strengthens the relationship between 
Information Control and Environmental Disclosure Score (β=0.68; p<0.01). Thus, we find 
support for H5b but not H4b. These results are depicted in the interaction plots in Figures 7a and 
7b. Again, the relationship between Information Access/Information Control and Environmental 
Disclosure Score is almost non-existent for focal firms that do not engage in internal 
environmental practices. This finding suggests that practicing environmental sustainability 
internally could allow focal firms to further unlock environmental information embedded in their 
supply networks. Finally, from Model (11) of Table 3 (and as depicted in Figure 7c), we find that 
Environmental Quality Management moderates the inverted-U relationship between Supply 
Network Complexity and Environmental Disclosure Score, supporting H6b. Thus, we find 
consistent evidence overall that firms that engage in environmental management practices 
themselves are better equipped to leverage their network positions to extract environmental 
information from their supply networks towards being more transparent.  
 We find strong interaction effects for Information Access with Environmental Supplier 
Management (but not with Environmental Quality Management). Conversely, we find strong 
interaction effects for Information Control and Supply Network Complexity with Environmental 
Quality Management (but not with Environmental Supplier Management). Thus, we find evidence 
that both Environmental Supplier Management and Environmental Quality Management are 




focal firm’s supply network. However, our finding of multiple significant interaction effects for 
Environmental Quality Management suggests that resource-constrained firms contemplating the 
implementation of governance practices may consider favoring internal environmental quality 
management practices over external environmental supply management initiatives.  
<INSERT TABLES 2, 3 AND FIGURES 6, 7 ABOUT HERE> 
Additional Analyses 
As a robustness check, we also explore whether information access and information control exhibit 
diminishing returns such as those observed with supply network complexity. However, we find 
that Information Access and Information Control both exhibit positive monotonic relationships 
with Environmental Disclosure Score. We also run our models using a panel random effects 
specification, with standard errors clustered by country of the focal firm. This approach did not 
qualitatively change our findings. To further account for differences across firms, we include three 
additional controls – Number of Customers, End-Consumer Proximity, and Average Supplier 
Environmental Disclosure Score. The results (see Appendix Table A4) show that our main 
findings remain qualitatively similar even with the addition of the aforementioned controls. 
Additionally, as anticipated we find Number of Customers and End-Consumer Proximity to be 
positively associated with the extent of environmental information disclosure by the focal firm. 
(Note: several robustness results not in Appendix due to page limit). 
Alternative Measure of the Dependent Variable. We use data on firm participation in the CDP’s 
annual Climate Change Questionnaire as an alternative measure for the extent of environmental 
information disclosure. Candidate firms are those that are traded on various indices such as S&P 
500, Euro 300, FTSE 350, and BSE, covering North America, South America, Europe, the Middle 




to the questionnaire. Companies are also welcome to respond even without invitation. Note that 
the climate change questionnaire is separate from the Supply Chain Questionnaire (Jira and Toffel 
2013) also managed by the CDP. The Supply Chain Questionnaire is only sent out on behalf of 
CDP partner firms that request information from their suppliers.  
 We use the focal firm’s response to the CDP’s climate change questionnaire as an indicator for 
a greater extent of environmental information disclosure. We use a logit model using Responded 
to CDP as the dependent measure and estimate the model for firms where information on the 
response status was available. The results (shown in Appendix A5) are in line with our original 
findings. However, we find weaker support for the interaction effects of environmental quality 
management, which may be either due to the reduction in the sample size or potential self-selection 
by participating firms.  
5.  Discussion 
Successful firms have long realized the importance of supply chains to their bottom lines. For 
example, companies such as Walmart and 3M have constantly broadened their lenses to closely 
evaluate not only their own operations but also those of the companies that they source from. Such 
supply chain management strategies have provided benefits in areas such as process improvement 
and product development. Firms are now realizing that the same approach could be successfully 
deployed in meeting environmental goals (such as mitigating the end-of-life environmental 
impacts of products, reducing emissions, and improving transparency). Yet, a key step towards 
realizing these environmental goals is being cognizant about the provenance of environmental 
factors within the supply chain. Indeed, up to three quarters of the greenhouse gas (GHG) 




firms’ supply chains, i.e., Scope 3 emissions (Huang et al., 2009; Matthews et al., 2008). Supply 
chain transparency is therefore becoming increasingly important (Doorey, 2011; New, 2010). 
Building on the prior literature on information sharing in supply chains and supply chain 
structure, we posit that structural characteristics of a focal firm’s supply network have implications 
for information flows within the network and, ultimately, the extent of environmental information 
disclosure by the focal firm. To test our hypotheses, we use Bloomberg’s proprietary Supply Chain 
Relationships (SPLC) database to construct the supply networks corresponding to 3,105 firm-year 
observations (over the two-year period 2013-2014) for focal firms located in approximately 50 
countries and spanning more than 100 GICS sub-industries. Using focal firms as identifiers, we 
link this data with environmental disclosure and financial data from Bloomberg. We use 
Bloomberg’s proprietary Environmental Disclosure Score to reflect a focal firm’s extent of 
environmental information disclosure. This environmental disclosure score is based on up to 120 
disclosure-related indicators and is used by more than 320,000 subscribers globally, including 
companies, investors, and analysts. Due to the diversity of data sources and industry- and country- 
and domain-specific standardization, the score substantially alleviates methodological concerns of 
lack of comprehensiveness, self-selection, and corporate greenwashing, which are often faced by 
other environmental disclosure measures. 
We find that a focal firm’s information access (i.e., closeness centrality) and information 
control (i.e., betweenness centrality) are positively associated with its extent of environmental 
information disclosure. Higher closeness centrality implies quicker access to and less distortion of 
information from the supply network (Lee et al., 1997; Schilling & Phelps, 2007), while higher 
betweenness centrality enhances a firm’s ability to access wider, non-redundant sources of 




have implications for enhancing environmental transparency in supply chains. In particular, our 
findings suggest that firms with “shorter” supply chains and greater leverage over their supply 
chain partners will themselves be more transparent. Hence, targeting such influential firms may be 
effective in improving participation in and response to transparency programs.  Yet, our analysis 
does reveal potential “dark sides” (Uzzi, 1997; Villena et al., 2011) in the form of evidence that 
excessive supply network density may inhibit the focal firm’s ability to effectively access and 
leverage information from its supply network. 
For supply chain managers, we have identified salient network characteristics that reflect a 
firm’s location and prominence in the context of its supply chain network, and the associations of 
these characteristics with the firm’s extent of environmental information disclosure. While it may 
be challenging for firms to alter the configuration of their supply chain networks in the short run, 
our study suggests that governance mechanisms such as external environmental supplier 
management and internal environmental quality management enhance the informational benefits 
from an existing structural configuration.  
First, our results suggest evidence that firms that engage their supply chain partners in 
environmental practices are able to be more transparent themselves. This finding is consistent with 
the OM literature that posits that supplier development initiatives have important informational 
benefits (Muthulingam & Agrawal, 2016). Furthermore, partnerships for environmental initiatives 
with suppliers may open new information gateways possibly due to increased trust (Özer et al., 
2011). For companies that intend to achieve greater transparency (e.g., achieve higher 
environmental disclosure scores from external assessors such as Bloomberg), our evidence 
suggests that it would be wise to institute or expand environmental supplier development 




substantially larger proportion of their total supply chain carbon emissions by implementing 
environmental initiatives targeting suppliers upstream in their supply network. These initiatives 
have improved their measurement and reporting of Scope 3 emissions emanating from their 
upstream supply network (Blanco et al., 2016).  
Second, firms seeking to enhance their transparency could implement environmental quality 
management practices within their own facilities as doing so translates into a more effective use 
of information flows moving through their supply networks. It is plausible that firms that 
implement environmental management systems in-house are better equipped to make use of the 
information flowing from their supply networks. This could be because firms with environmental 
quality management experience can better interpret, assimilate, and take action on environmental 
information extracted from the supply network.  
Thus, both environmental supplier management and environmental quality management are 
managerially important due to their distinct roles in extracting and leveraging environmental 
information in a focal firm’s supply network. However, when facing resource constraints, our 
results suggest that firms contemplating the implementation of governance practices should 
consider favoring internal environmental quality management practices over external 
environmental supply management initiatives. 
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Table 1A  Summary Statistics and Correlations 
S. No Variable/Measure Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Environmental Disclosure Score 25.00 17.00 1 
         
2 Information Access  (Closeness Centrality) 0.46 1.18 0.25* 1 
        
3 Information Control  (Betweenness Centrality) 0.56 1.89 0.26* 0.70* 1 





0.08 1.00 0.21* 0.58* 0.55* 1       
5 Environmental  Quality Management 0.72 0.45 0.42* 0.10* 0.15* 0.10* 1 
     
6 Environmental  Supplier Management 0.56 0.50 0.58* 0.28* 0.23* 0.23* 0.26* 1 
    
7 Ownership 1.95 0.21 0.10* -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.07* 0.06* 1    
8 Revenue Turns 8.05 1.64 0.40* 0.43* 0.39* 0.36* 0.00 0.34* 0.02 1   
9 Sales Growth 0.04 0.40 -0.16* 0.07* 0.06* -0.01 -0.15* -0.08* -0.06* 0.01 1  
10 Gross Margin 0.31 0.19 0.05* 0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.13* 0.08* -0.05* 0.01 0.11* 1 
11 ROA 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.11* 0.07* 0.01 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.28* 0.41* 
* p < 0.05 
 
Table 1B  Composition by Industry and Region 
Industry Freq. Percent   Region Freq. Percent 
Consumer Discretionary 531 17.1   Africa 35 1.13 
Consumer Staples 285 9.18   Asia 1,649 53.15 
Energy 136 4.38   Europe 508 16.34 
Health Care 244 7.86   North America 817 26.29 
Industrials 640 20.61   Oceania 53 1.71 
Information Technology 648 20.87   South America 43 1.38 
Materials 458 14.75   Total 3,105 100 
Telecommunication Services 79 2.54         
Utilities 84 2.71         






Table 2  Analysis of information access, information control, and supply network 
complexity 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Information Access   0.74***       0.34* 
    (0.13)       (0.20) 
Information Control     0.68***     0.62*** 
      (0.20)     (0.21) 
Supply Network Complexity       0.19 0.89 0.58 
        (0.25) (0.61) (0.64) 
Supply Network Complexity2         -0.16* -0.10 
          (0.09) (0.10) 
Environmental Supplier Manage-
ment 11.83*** 11.78*** 11.76*** 11.83*** 11.79*** 11.72*** 
  (0.87) (0.87) (0.85) (0.87) (0.89) (0.87) 
Environmental Quality Management 8.12*** 8.07*** 8.00*** 8.11*** 8.10*** 7.96*** 
  (1.91) (1.93) (1.89) (1.94) (1.94) (1.92) 
Ownership 2.01** 1.96** 1.89** 2.03** 2.09** 1.92** 
  (0.92) (0.92) (0.88) (0.93) (0.92) (0.88) 
Revenue Turns 2.78*** 2.61*** 2.42*** 2.77*** 2.73*** 2.34*** 
  (0.68) (0.65) (0.71) (0.68) (0.65) (0.67) 
Sales Growth -3.48*** -3.48*** -3.22** -3.52*** -3.48*** -3.25** 
  (1.17) (1.18) (1.22) (1.16) (1.21) (1.24) 
Gross Margin 0.38 0.51 0.51 0.38 0.38 0.56 
  (1.47) (1.45) (1.38) (1.47) (1.46) (1.38) 
ROA -4.97 -4.84 -4.92 -4.90 -4.70 -4.69 
  (7.26) (7.20) (7.01) (7.26) (7.24) (6.98) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 














  (4.78) (4.73) (5.15) (4.75) (4.61) (4.88) 
Observations 3105 3105 3105 3105 3105 3105 
R-squared 0.558 0.559 0.561 0.558 0.558 0.562 
Dependent Variable Measure = Environmental Disclosure Score;  





Table 3  Analysis of moderating effects 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Information Access -0.17       -0.20 0.11       0.44 0.06 
  (0.22)       (0.21) (0.52)       (0.62) (0.54) 
Information Control   0.06     0.19   -0.05     -0.01 -0.16 
    (0.19)     (0.20)   (0.21)     (0.28) (0.21) 
Supply Network Complexity     0.27 -0.47 0.04     -0.88 -2.47** -2.19*** -2.43*** 
      (0.28) (1.32) (1.15)     (0.59) (0.99) (0.65) (0.80) 
Supply Network Complexity2       0.16 0.08       0.39** 0.34** 0.45*** 
        (0.25) (0.22)       (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) 
Information Access × Environmental Supplier Management 1.72***       1.12***           1.29*** 
  (0.56)       (0.40)           (0.35) 
Information Control × Environmental Supplier Management   0.75**     0.41           0.14 
    (0.35)     (0.31)           (0.30) 
Supply Network Complexity × Environmental Supplier Management     -0.16 2.25 0.89           0.02 
      (0.45) (1.54) (1.12)           (1.04) 
Supply Network Complexity2 × Environmental Supplier Management       -0.60* -0.35           -0.23 
        (0.32) (0.23)           (0.20) 
Information Access × Environmental Quality Management           0.88       -0.13 -0.50 
            (0.78)       (0.78) (0.77) 
Information Control × Environmental Quality Management             0.87***     0.76*** 0.68*** 
              (0.28)     (0.22) (0.24) 
Supply Network Complexity × Environmental Quality Management               1.31* 3.94*** 3.25*** 3.60*** 
                (0.74) (1.26) (0.85) (0.87) 
Supply Network Complexity2 × Environmental Quality Management                 -0.63*** -0.50** -0.53*** 
                  (0.20) (0.19) (0.17) 
Environmental Supplier Mgmt. 11.22*** 11.58*** 11.84*** 12.19*** 11.53*** 11.75*** 11.74*** 11.77*** 11.71*** 11.64*** 11.41*** 
  (0.70) (0.76) (0.88) (0.98) (0.75) (0.85) (0.85) (0.84) (0.86) (0.84) (0.73) 
Environmental Quality Mgmt. 8.03*** 7.98*** 8.11*** 8.06*** 7.93*** 7.86*** 7.75*** 8.16*** 8.62*** 8.19*** 8.31*** 
  (1.85) (1.86) (1.94) (1.93) (1.86) (1.82) (1.75) (1.84) (1.69) (1.73) (1.79) 
Ownership 1.72* 1.80** 2.02** 2.09** 1.73** 1.93** 1.72** 1.99** 1.97** 1.68* 1.52* 
  (0.87) (0.85) (0.93) (0.91) (0.84) (0.91) (0.83) (0.92) (0.92) (0.86) (0.85) 
Revenue Turns 2.53*** 2.43*** 2.77*** 2.71*** 2.31*** 2.58*** 2.41*** 2.77*** 2.73*** 2.33*** 2.31*** 
  (0.66) (0.70) (0.68) (0.66) (0.66) (0.67) (0.71) (0.68) (0.66) (0.67) (0.67) 
Sales Growth -3.38*** -3.23** -3.53*** -3.61*** -3.34*** -3.46*** -3.19** -3.56*** -3.48*** -3.24** -3.33*** 
  (1.21) (1.22) (1.18) (1.16) (1.20) (1.23) (1.23) (1.13) (1.21) (1.24) (1.18) 
Gross Margin 0.48 0.46 0.39 0.38 0.53 0.58 0.50 0.44 0.49 0.63 0.62 
  (1.42) (1.34) (1.48) (1.48) (1.37) (1.47) (1.36) (1.52) (1.53) (1.43) (1.44) 
ROA -4.75 -5.15 -4.92 -4.62 -4.73 -5.05 -5.14 -5.00 -5.08 -5.16 -5.05 
  (7.27) (6.99) (7.27) (7.32) (7.07) (7.22) (6.99) (7.32) (7.31) (6.98) (7.05) 
Constant -35.78*** -34.94*** -38.13*** -37.93*** -34.04*** -35.33*** -34.33*** -38.13*** -38.04*** -33.53*** -34.03*** 
  (4.89) (5.13) (4.74) (4.51) (4.88) (5.03) (5.25) (4.75) (4.54) (5.08) (5.08) 
Observations 3105 3105 3105 3105 3105 3105 3105 3105 3105 3105 3105 
Adjusted R-squared 0.533 0.534 0.530 0.531 0.535 0.531 0.534 0.530 0.531 0.535 0.536 
Log Likelihood -11923.3 -11920.9 -11935.0 -11930.7 -11914.3 -11929.7 -11920.0 -11932.8 -11930.0 -11915.7 -11908.9 
 
Dependent Variable Measure = Environmental Disclosure Score;  







(a) Lexmark (b) Xerox 
FIGURE 1 Depiction of Varying Levels of Supply Network Complexity 
 





FIGURE 3  Global Coverage of the Sample 
Notes. Color hues and labels for countries denote representation in the final sample  
 
FIGURE 4 Histograms of Environmental Disclosure Score by Industry Group 
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FIGURE 6a  Information access 
with environmental supplier management  
 
FIGURE 6b  Information control 
with environmental supplier management 
 
FIGURE 6c  Supply network complexity 






FIGURE 7a  Information access 
with environmental quality management  
 
FIGURE 7b  Information control  
with environmental quality management 
 
FIGURE 7c  Supply network complexity 
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